Deputy Director, Institute of Philosophy, University of London

Research

Forthcoming

What's the Point of Knowledge? (OUP 2019)

Epistemology as a System of Universal Hypothetical Imperatives
Philosophical Issues (invited for May 2019 issue) 
 

Publications

A Solution to Knowledge's Threshold Problem
Philosophical Studies

Intuitions, Reflective Judgments, and Experimental Philosophy
Synthese

Skepticism about Meta-skepticism: Meditations on Experimental Philosophy
Episteme

Skepticism and Contextualism
Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism

The Universal Core of Knowledge
Synthese

The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions
Philosophy Compass 

Stabilizing Knowledge
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge
Synthese

Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information?
Erkenntnis

Understanding
Oxford Bibliographies (w/ Stephen Grimm)

The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism
Erkenntnis

‘Knows’ Entails Truth
Journal of Philosophical Research

Review of Epistemic Evaluations: A Purposeful Epistemology   
Analysis

Current Research

What's the Point of Understanding? 

This paper explores the social role of understanding and argues that knowledge is more central to our epistemic life than understanding. 

Relatedly, for three years I managed the $4.5 million Varieties of Understanding grant directed by Stephen Grimm. I also organized a Summer Seminar on Understanding in New York City. 
 

The Role of Truth in Politics

I am at the early stages of writing a book about the role of truth in politics. Much has been written about the post-truth world of fake news, dodgy experts, and “alternative facts.” But in the current crisis over truth, journalists and academic commentators have ignored recent epistemological insights about the nature of disagreement and the dark side of doubt. This book explores the role and value of truth, the question of which informational sources we should trust, and moral questions about who is accountable for combating fake news. 
 

Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists

Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s justification for that claim is less than fully conclusive. According to the purist, knowledge does not depend on practical factors. Fallibilism and purism are widely assumed to be compatible; in fact, the combination of these views has been called the ‘ho-hum,’ obvious, traditional view of knowledge. But I will argue that fallibilism and purism are incompatible. The best explanation for fallibilism requires one to reject purism, while maintaining purism should lead one to reject fallibilism. It follows that the orthodox, traditional, obvious, ho-hum view of knowledge is deeply mistaken.

In Preparation

1. An edited volume titled Political Epistemology
2. The Oxford Bibliographies entry for Political Epistemology
3. A paper on veritism and epistemic democracy
4. A paper on Aristotle and epistemic relativism